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Swinging Shale: Shale Oil, the Global Oil Market, and the
Geopolitics of Oil
INWOOK KIM
Singapore Management University
Is shale oil “revolutionizing” the global oil market and the geopolitics of oil? If so, how? While two aspects of the shale boom—
a new source of supply and a cause for the price collapse in 2014–2015—dominate the conventional wisdom, I argue that the
most revolutionary change is the least understood aspect of shale oil—shale oil producers’ rise as new swing suppliers due to
its unique extraction technique and cost structure. Shale oil producers also differ from traditional swing producers in motives,
contexts, and an amount of accessible excess capacity such that while shale oil lowers the medium-term price ceiling, it does
not eliminate short-term price volatility. By examining the geopolitics of oil since the advent of shale oil, I analyze how such
new market realities have or have not altered the US foreign policy on issues involving possible oil supply disruptions, Saudi
Arabia’s long-held special status in US grand strategy, rationale for US withdrawal from the Persian Gulf, and the foreign policy
of China, the largest oil importer today, and Russia, a major petrostate.
After decades of investment and innovation, shale oil, previ-
ously inaccessible, finally made its commercial debut in the
early 2010s. On the surface, the causes and consequences
of this development appear anything but typical. Shale oil
is found in unique geological conditions, trapped—unlike
conventional oil—in impermeable rock. To extract it, the in-
dustry perfected a noble set of technology—hydraulic frac-
turing (or “fracking”) and horizontal drilling, which accord-
ing to Daniel Yergin was “the biggest innovation in energy
this century” (Yergin 2014). Many speculated that the con-
sequences would be equally groundbreaking, if not more so.
Goldman Sachs suggested that a “new oil order” (Goldman
Sachs n.d.) was emerging, potentially “the most politically
disruptive factor in the global oil market since the forma-
tion of OPEC in 1960” (Ed Morse, quoted in Crooks 2015),
after which, according to Financial Times, “… nothing will
ever be the same” (Crooks 2015). The advent of shale oil
was labeled a “revolution,” and arguably no word better cap-
tures the excitement and anxiety surrounding the political
economy of the shale boom.
However, despite the revolution shale oil allegedly repre-
sents, IR scholarship has been virtually silent on its nature,
dynamics, and consequences. Tellingly, a keyword search on
“shale” returns no results in leading political science jour-
nals.1 The scarcity of reliable guidance is clearly problem-
atic. No traded commodity is more strategized than oil, and,
accordingly, the political economy of oil has been integral,
historically, to the US national security calculus; the wealth
and security of its allies and rivals; their foreign policy and
grand strategy choices; and, by extension, the regional and
global security environment (Yergin 2008; Painter 2012).
Inwook Kim is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Singapore
Management University.
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Few doubt that the shale boom will matter in these areas.
Equally few, however, know how it will matter.2
How does shale oil alter the geopolitics of oil? The con-
ventional wisdom tends to center around two inter-related
aspects of the shale boom—shale oil as a new source of sup-
ply, on the one hand, and as a cause for the price collapse
in 2014–2015, on the other hand. While the political ramifi-
cations of these factors are real, neither is new in the deeply
cyclical oil market. The phenomenon of rising supply and
falling prices in response to an extended period of high
oil prices merely replicates earlier episodes of boom and
bust witnessed throughout the twentieth century (Clayton
2015). Limiting the discussion of the impact of shale oil to
the added supply and the price plunge therefore neglects
the more important task of distinguishing the shale boom
with typical supply shocks. What makes shale oil different
from conventional oil? How do the differences matter in the
geopolitics of oil?
I argue that the most revolutionary change is the least un-
derstood aspects of shale’s rise—shale producers’ potential
to act as swing producers and the fact that their productions
are uncoordinated. First of all, in times of price changes,
shale oil producers are more able to “swing” themarket than
conventional oil producers by either pumping additional
oil on short notice or leaving the market more promptly.
The greater supply responsiveness to price signals emerges
due to unique sets of technical specifications and the cost
structure of shale production. Unlike conventional oil fields
that take years to drill and complete, shale oil wells can be
developed in a matter of months, and accordingly, fracking,
the technique for extracting shale oil, can be performed at
the time of producers’ preference. The cost structure is also
different from that of conventional oil, in that the upfront
sunk cost forms a relatively small portion of total production
costs, lowering the barriers to entry and exit. A combination
of the technical feasibility of adjusting production volume
on short notice and lower barriers to entry and exit creates
distinctly permissive conditions for shale producers to
respond more swiftly than producers of conventional oil.
2O’Sullivan (2017) and Van de Graaf and Bradshaw (2018) are notable
exceptions.
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2 Swinging Shale
The history of oil shows that swing producers, most
notably the Texas Railroad Commission (TRC) and Saudi
Arabia, have played a critical role as a credible, though
imperfect, buffer against price volatility. In particular, swing
producers operate the so-called spare production capacity,
which, on many occasions, has been used to make up
the lost barrels from unanticipated supply disruptions,
contributing to market stabilization. This rarely available
and valuable function made the location, amount, and
reliability of spare capacity a key consideration for US policy
in the Persian Gulf and a significant variable in its ability
to maintain its prestige as a patron to its allies and a global
hegemon overall (Kim 2019).
On the other hand, shale oil producers’ swinging capacity
operates on different organizational and production logics
from the ones of traditional swing producers. Whereas the
TRC or Saudi Arabia has generally pursued long-term mar-
ket stability and political interests, enjoyed a high level of
control and cooperation, and drawn from limited existing
excess capacity, shale oil producers are short-term profit-
driven and uncoordinated, and have access to potentially
a larger pool of excess capacity, thanks to the technology
and economics involved. New market realities result. In
contrast to the TRC and Saudi Arabia, shale oil producers
suffer from a lack of centralized authority and a huge
intra-industry variation in production conditions, such that
prompt and effective intervention cannot be expected in
the short term. However, compared to traditional swing pro-
ducers, shale oil is capable of offering a more durable buffer
against medium-term and structural shocks as intra-industry
heterogeneity recedes over time and shale producers ex-
ploit the unprecedented speed with which wells can be
developed. In short, shale oil lowers the medium-term price
ceiling but does not eliminate short-term price volatility.
I discuss four strategic implications of the new market
realities. First, contrary to popular expectations, the flour-
ishing but uncoordinated domestic shale producers do not
create much new latitude for US foreign policy on issues
involving possible oil supply disruptions, barring some
exceptional circumstances. Second, as the risk of short-term
volatility remains, Saudi Arabia’s unique market power
and strategic value will persist, and shale oil is unlikely to
overturn the Saudi Arabia’s long-held special status in US
foreign policy anytime soon. By examining the latest dy-
namics of US–Saudi Arabian relations with respect to Iran’s
nuclear program and the sanctions on Iran in 2012–2019,
I show that, today, little has changed. Third, the continued
irreplaceability of Saudi Arabia’s market power means that
one cannot reasonably advocate for US withdrawal from the
region based on the shale boom. However, I caution against
equating this reasoning with opposition to withdrawal, since
the logic behind the argument for withdrawal remains
robust based on strategic and military assessments, entirely
independent of shale oil. Lastly, I examine how the more
resilient and stable medium-term price ceiling affects other
great powers, most notably China, the largest oil importer
today, and Russia, a major petrostate.
The paper first critically examines the conventional focus
on the volume of added supply and the magnitude of the
price plunge in 2014–2015. An in-depth analysis follows on
the technical specifications and business conditions that in-
centivize shale oil producers to develop and maintain excess
capacity. The last section surveys the historical linkage be-
tween spare capacity, the oil market, and the geopolitics of
oil, compares the price-swinging effectiveness of traditional
swing producers and today’s shale oil industry, and discusses
what shale oil as swing supply means for US foreign policy
and the global geopolitics of oil. I conclude by suggesting
directions for future research.
Rising Global Supply, Falling Oil Price, and Beyond
US foreign policy is a fair place to begin inquiries about
the impact of shale on international politics. American
foreign policy has been full of initiatives to ensure the
stability and security of the oil market, which have in turn
shaped the politics and security of regions around the
globe. Scholars recently outlined how oil matters in US
foreign policy (Deutch, Schlesinger, and Victor 2006; Glaser
2013), critically examined its alleged vulnerability to oil
coercion (Kelanic 2012; Hughes and Long 2015), and
probed the wisdom of the current form and level of military
commitment in the Persian Gulf (Gholz and Press 2010;
Rovner and Talmadge 2014; Glaser and Kelanic 2016).
Curiously, although this surge of interest in the role of oil
in American foreign policy coincided with the shale boom,
shale oil itself has gone largely unnoted, usually appearing
as a passing note and never as an independent subject of in-
quiry. This neglect may be partly attributable to general un-
familiarity with the basics of shale oil production, including
its actors; industry structure; technical requirements; busi-
ness operation; and, ultimately, what the new market reality
is going to look like. Instead, media commentary and policy
analysis dominate the discussion today. I critically examine
the two most widely invoked themes—US energy indepen-
dence and consequences of more oil and lower price on the
global politics. Some of these themes merit more attention
than others, but none captures what truly makes shale oil
unique.
Energy Independence Myth
Since the days of Richard Nixon, achieving energy indepen-
dence has been considered a “holy grail” in US politics. At a
superficial level, the United States appears to be approach-
ing that goal today. Thanks to the shale oil, “the most dra-
matic sustained rises in output ever seen by individual coun-
tries” (IEA 2017b, 70), US crude oil production went above
10 mb/d in 2018 for the first time since 1971, surpassing
Saudi Arabia and Russia at the same time to become the
world’s largest crude oil producer (EIA 2018b). The rapid
rise of shale oil also was a key driver behind the historic
lift of the forty-year-old ban on crude oil export under the
Obama administration in December 2015 (Colgan and Van
de Graaf 2017; Downie 2019).
Consequently, US oil import dependence drastically fell
from above 40 percent in 2012 down to below 10 percent in
late 2018, and in September 2019, the United States made
a historic transition to being a net exporter of petroleum
(figure 1)3 for the first time since 1949 (EIA 2019b).4
The same report expected the United States to be a net
petroleum exporter in 2020 on an annual basis for the first
time in its recorded history, although it is being complicated
by an unanticipated outbreak of Covid-19 and the price war
launched between Saudi Arabia and Russia in March 2020,
collapsing the oil price and threatening US shale businesses.
Nevertheless, this is an astonishing change, given that the
likelihood of the United States becoming a net oil exporter
3EIA data. Oil import dependence is a ratio of net import of crude oil and
petroleum products by total oil consumption.
4Petroleum trade calculates both crude oil and petroleum products. While
the United States is net exporter of petroleum products, it remains a net importer
of crude oil.
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Figure 1. US oil production volume and oil import dependence (January 2012 to May 2019).
had seemed next to none prior to the advent of shale oil.
Politicians quickly claimed its geopolitical significance. In
2015, President Obama boasted that the United States was
“number one in oil and gas” and therefore finally “free from
the grip of foreign oil as we’ve been in almost 30 years” (The
White House 2015). The Trump administration went even
further, calling the US oil position “energy dominance,”
which goes beyond self-reliance and freedom from threats
of oil embargo and extends to “increasing [US] global lead-
ership and influence” (The White House 2017).
Equating self-sufficiency with energy independence, let
alone dominance, is more illusionary than actual, however
(Levi 2013b, 196). Oil is a fungible good, and the world oil
market operates more or less as “one great pool” (Adelman
1984, 5). In the globally integrated market, the oil price is
determined by an intersection of global supply and demand,
not bilateral or regional—data show that oil prices across
regions are closely co-integrated on the spot market rather
than moving independently of one another (Bachmeier and
Griffin 2006). The location of oil production sites, there-
fore, has little bearing on a state’s access to oil in the mar-
ket. By extension, a supply or demand shock in one region
is spread equally across the global market and not restricted
to the region.
Trading in the globally integrated market, a “self-
sufficient” United States would still be exposed to the same
foreign supply and demand factors that have long generated
a volatile price movement (Glaser and Kelanic 2016, 6).
Similarly, the oil export does not fundamentally expand
the strategic perimeters of US foreign policy, as oil export
itself cannot independently function as a tool for statecraft
(Colgan and Van de Graaf 2017, 34). The logic behind the
idea of being “free from the grip of foreign oil” is therefore
deeply misplaced, if not outright flawed.
Consequences of More Oil and Lower Price: déjà vu?
The benefits of shale oil are subtler and more qualified
than what simplistic notions of energy independence and
dominance suggest, centering on the dilution of supply and
the effects of cheaper oil on the politics of oil around the
globe. Neither of these factors, however, characterizes the
truly “revolutionary” changes that shale oil entails.
First, adding shale oil into the global supply chain dilutes
the level of supply concentration in the Persian Gulf. Shale
oil outpaced OPEC in terms of production increase in the
past decade—between 2008 and 2018, OPEC added 2.05
mb/d or 17.6 percent of the global supply increase, while
the United States supplied 8.53 mb/d of new oil, account-
ing for 73.2 percent of the increase.5 Free of geopolitical
disruptions, the rising share of US shale oil adds new lay-
ers of shielding against the historical sources of price un-
certainty and volatility originating from geopolitics in the
Persian Gulf. In other words, ceteris paribus, the lower sup-
ply concentration means that a supply disruption on a simi-
lar scale originating from the Persian Gulf, whether from oil
coercion or geopolitical events, will have fewer ramifications
for the global oil price (Hughes and Long 2015).
The benefits of supply dilution need qualification, how-
ever. The OPEC’s ability to disrupt the oil market is already
questionable at best, because OPEC is neither homoge-
neous nor harmonious and suffers from declining market
power (Colgan 2014). Furthermore, because the addition
of shale oil is factored into the global market, any benefits
of reinforced stability are not enjoyed exclusively by the
United States but shared equally by consumers across the
globe and therefore are of a very different nature from what
energy independence advocates posit.
Second, the 2014 price shock, which scholars largely at-
tribute to the sudden addition of a large amount of shale
oil to the global supply chain, entailed potentially penetra-
tive and transformative effects on the politics of oil globally.
It severely disrupted the political economies of oil rentier
states, significantly improved the energy security conditions
of importers, and therefore altered the strategic balance
across these states, all of which affects US management of
allies and foes around the globe.
While the price shock represents a substantive pillar in
the ongoing shale hype, it is worth remembering that a
price collapse of this magnitude is not unprecedented. In
5Author’s calculation based on figures from British Petroleum Company
(2019).
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Figure 2. Three-monthly oil price movements in 1984–1989 and 2013–2017.
fact, the causes, contexts, and conditions of the 2014 price
shock exhibit a striking similarity to those of the 1985–1986
price collapse, both being typical, supply-driven shocks
(figure 2). Both cases were primarily conditioned by a
supply glut (powered by new offshore fields in the Gulf of
Mexico and the North Sea in the 1980s and US shale oil in
the 2010s, both of which had become commercially viable,
thanks to prior periods of high oil price). In addition, the
two shocks have in common the situation in which Saudi
Arabia’s decision to “sweat” the market in a bid to protect
its market share against new competitors exacerbated the
oversupply and created market anticipation of sustained
supply glut (Ansari 2017). Both periods also coincided
with stagnating demand—absolute decline in demand from
major economies in 1979–1983 and unexpectedly lower de-
mand due to weakening of the global economy (Baumeister
and Kilian 2016)—which intensified the supply–demand
disequilibrium and the downward pressure on oil price.
Without denying the political ramifications of the price
shock, we would do well to avoid overstating the uniqueness
of the latest sustained price fall. In fact, studies about other
historical boom-and-bust cycles in the oil market can equip
political science with richer data and insight into the nature
of the latest shale oil shock (Clayton 2015, 169–77). More
importantly, however, to truly appreciate the impact of shale
oil, one must look beyond the movements of rising global
supply and falling price. Otherwise, shale oil becomes no
different, analytically, from other earlier new sources of sup-
ply. To analyze whether and how the shale “revolution” dif-
fers, one must start by problematizing the fundamentals that
enable and organize the shale boom—how does the shale oil
industry function? Who are the actors, what is the market
logic, and what does the industry structure look like? How,
if at all, do these factors distinguish shale from conventional
oil production and the conventional oil industry?
Revolution Is in the (Technical) Detail
As noted by some commentators, what makes shale oil truly
different is its high supply responsiveness to price changes
(Yergin 2015). In other words, shale producers can act as
swing producers who operate some “volume of production
that can be brought on within 30 days and sustained at least
for 90 days” (EIA 2018a), also known as spare production ca-
pacity. This foundational claim about shale oil, however, has
not been properly spelled out, leading to confusion about its
geopolitical significance. To fill this critical gap, this section
elaborates how its unique specification for extraction tech-
nique and its particular cost structure create shale’s greater
responsiveness to price changes relative to conventional oil
production.
Technical Feasibility
The technology of shale oil extraction involves two distinct
features that are not found in conventional oil extraction,
which makes oil production on short notice technically
feasible and even desirable. First, shale oil wells can be
drilled and completed much more quickly than conven-
tional oil wells. Developing oil wells into production has
been traditionally a time- and resource-consuming process,
involving field exploration, wells’ drilling, and completing
installation of production equipment. For conventional oil,
such process typically requires three to ten years (Qabazard,
Fantini, and Haderer 2013, 35). Extracting oil under more
challenging conditions such as deep sea presents much
bigger technical difficulties and therefore even longer time
and more resources need to be invested before its first drop
of oil enters the market.
Development of shale oil wells, in contrast, takes a much
shorter time. The Baker Institute, for instance, estimates
between 35 and 90 days for total spud-to-sales time, or from
the time drilling begins until the first oil is brought to sales
(Collins and Medlock III 2017, 2). Energy Information
Administration (EIA) similarly estimates that an average
time to drill a new well to be less than two months in North
Dakota in 2014–2017, where the Bakken field, one of the
largest shale oil fields in the United States, is located (EIA
2019a). Actual time lag is likely to be longer, because both
estimates exclude pre-drilling phases such as investment
and exploration. On average, about one year is required
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Figure 3. DUC wells and oil price in 2014–2019. Source: EIA (2018c).
between investment and the first production (Bornstein,
Krusell, and Rebelo 2017, 34).
Second, shale oil production is heavily front-loaded rela-
tive to conventional oil such that the shale producers exploit
the short time span for well development to respond to price
increases promptly. More specifically, as much as 60 and 25
percent of the oil in shale wells is produced in the first and
second years, respectively (Kleinberg et al. 2018, 72). Com-
pared to conventional oil wells, whose yearly production vol-
ume declines at a slow and steady rate over their life cycle,
the production rate for shale oil rapidly declines up to five
times faster after initial drilling (Bjornland, Nordvik, and
Rohrer 2017, 3). This front-loaded production makes the
shale oil production decision highly time-sensitive—shale
producers decide whether and when to drill and produce
based on short-term price expectations, while conventional
oil producers make decisions based on longer term price
prospects (Kleinberg et al. 2018, 73).
The quest for short-term profit has led shale oil pro-
ducers to create and maintain a pool of so-called drilled
but uncompleted wells (DUCs) to optimize the timing of
well completion (Bjornland, Nordvik, and Rohrer 2017, 3).
Technically, DUCs are created when wells are drilled,
cased, and cemented, without being completed, which
involves perforating, stimulating, and installing produc-
tion tubing and downhole pumps. These DUCs offer two
critical advantages—they do not incur maintenance costs
(Kleinberg et al. 2018, 74) and their turnaround time
to first production is very short. According to the Baker
Institute, well completion takes only ten to fourteen days,
with five to six more days required to commence sales
(Collins and Medlock III 2017, 1–2). The total duration of
fifteen to twenty days falls well within the thirty-day criterion
to qualify as excess capacity. From a business standpoint,
DUCs are particularly attractive because they allow firms to
optimize sales revenue by promptly triggering first produc-
tion in response to a price increase. Figure 3 shows that the
number of DUCs in the United States has steadily increased
from around 9,000 to over 16,000 between July 2014 and
July 2019, during which period the price of oil gradually
recovered from its lowest point of $30/b in February 2016
to $70/b in July 2018. The figure suggests a corresponding
increase in production potential or spare capacity from
utilizing DUCs.
Overall, due to the differences in well development, ex-
traction, and activation technique, shale oil has a short in-
vestment, development, and production cycle than conven-
tional oil. Such technical aspects enable shale production to
be highly responsive to price increases.
Lower Sunk Cost
Shale oil production also faces lower barriers to entry to
develop spare capacity due to a lower fixed-to-variable cost
ratio relative to conventional oil production. Fixed costs
are defined as costs that do not vary with the quantity of
output produced. In the oil industry, much of the fixed
cost occurs during the pre-production period in prospecting
the geological conditions, installing equipment, and drilling
and setting up extraction sites. Variable costs, on the other
hand, are defined as costs that increase with the production
volume, and in oil production, labor, transportation, and
well servicing form the major variable costs (Kaiser 2012,
318).
The ratio between fixed and variable costs significantly af-
fects investment decisions. When fixed costs make up a large
proportion of total production costs, upfront costs and risks
are higher, and so, too, is reluctance to commit in the first
place. In contrast, when fixed costs are relatively low in re-
lation to variable costs, firms face lower barriers to entry in
developing oil fields. For conventional oil production, the
fixed-to-variable cost ratio is relatively high, ranging between
40 and 60 percent of total production costs for onshore and
offshore production across the globe (Wall Street Journal
2016). Though these data combine oil and gas production,
EIA has similarly reported that “finding cost (which falls un-
der the fixed cost) usually have been much larger than lift-
ing costs (which belongs to the variable cost)” for pre–shale
era oil production (EIA 2011).
Cost barriers to entry are highest for offshore drilling. In
offshore development in the Gulf of Mexico, for instance,
above 60 percent of total cost was incurred at the drilling
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Figure 4. Oil price and rig counts, 2010–2017.
stage only (EIA 2016, 6). The sunk cost is prohibitively high
in absolute terms, too. The Jack/St. Malo Project, which
built the largest semi-submersible in the Gulf of Mexico in
the 2010s, cost $12 billion in infrastructure expenses alone
(EIA 2016, 113–14). The high level of uncertainty and risk
further complicates the decision. After spending $4.6 billion
since 2008, Shell had to abandon exploration and drilling in
Alaska’s Chukchi Sea only to end up with a meager volume
of reserves (Macalister 2015).
The fixed-to-variable cost ratio is the opposite for shale
oil production. Kleinberg et al. (2018), for instance, find
that out of a full-cycle breakeven price of $60–90/b in 2014,
$50–70 is the half-cycle breakeven price that covers a sum
of lifting cost, estimated to be below $20/b, and other vari-
able costs such as labor, drilling, and completing and stim-
ulating additional wells in developed fields with the goal of
maintaining level production. This leaves “purely fixed cost”
to range between approximately $10/b and $20/b, or about
20 percent of the full-cycle breakeven price, to cover “the ex-
penses of geophysical prospecting, exploratory drilling, and
measurements of the size and richness of the resource, ob-
taining legal rights, as well as above-ground infrastructure
cost” (Kleinberg et al. 2018, 73–74, 77).
Another way of approximating the fixed-to-variable cost
ratio is to compute the cost of building DUCs, which
offers a more accurate but ultimately similar argument.
Although DUCs are not equal to fixed costs—as wells are
left short of completion—the costs of DUCs are essentially
the costs of creating excess capacity since they can be
turned to production relatively quickly. According to an
EIA estimate, approximately 25 percent of total well costs
come from drilling and casing, two key components for
DUCs (EIA 2016, 2–3). Although the wide geological and
geographical variations across shale fields and the fast pace
of technological innovation make it difficult to estimate the
shale production cost structure with accuracy, available data
unequivocally point to the fact that shale oil production, in
which upfront investment makes up a smaller proportion
of total cost, presents relatively lower barriers to entry than
conventional onshore and offshore oil production (Krane
and Agerton 2015, 20–21; McNally 2017, 204).
Overall, a mix of technical feasibility to dial up and down
and relatively low sunk cost makes shale producers highly
responsive to price changes. For instance, figures 4 and 5
show a robust correlation of total rig count from the three
main shale oil-producing states for 2010–2017 and a number
of shale wells drilled and completed in 2014–2019, respec-
tively, to oil price movement. Though still in their infancy,
the latest research that systematically compares price elas-
ticities of supply across oil fields similarly finds that shale
producers adjust the production volume more swiftly than
conventional oil producers by a significant margin to both
simulated and actual price increases (Bjornland, Nordvik,
and Rohrer 2017; Newell and Prest 2019).
The swinging action happens in the opposite movement
of oil price, too. Studies find that because of the shale oil’s
higher marginal cost of production, “as the expected price
of oil declines, investment by tight (shale) oil producers
should cease before conventional oil investment” (Kilian
2017, 16). In the midst of a price crash in March and April
2020, for instance, shale producers were one of the first to
halt drilling and cancel investment (Reuters 2020), while US
Energy Secretary Dan Brouillette forecast that closures of
oil business can cost US production up to 3 mb/d by 2021
(Wang et al. 2020). In the exceptional circumstance of the
coronavirus-induced global economic showdown, the result-
ing drastic reduction in shale oil production is still unlikely
to swing the market on its own. Nevertheless, the prompt fall
in production and producers’ exits from the market show
that the shale oil’s greater responsiveness to price signals
works in both directions. Table 1 summarizes the central
tenets regarding the differences between conventional and
shale oil.
New Market Realities, Old Geopolitics?
These new market realities—shale producers’ potential to
swing the market—call for informed judgment about their
geopolitical implications. To do so, I first look at the histor-
ical links among spare capacity, the oil market, and geopol-
itics. I find that in addition to the possession of excess
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Figure 5. Oil price, shale wells drilled and completed, 2014–2019 (EIA 2018c).
Table 1. Summary of comparison
Conventional oil Shale oil
Technical feasibility Three to ten years to build One year from investment to sales
DUCs take less than one month to turn
into production wells
Barriers to entry and exit High (high fixed-to-total-cost ratio) Relatively low (low fixed-to-total-cost
ratio)
Price elasticity of supply Low High
capacity, the motives and level of cohesiveness among swing
producers also determine the rate at which supply adjust-
ment occurs. In these key contextual aspects, shale produc-
ers differ markedly from typical swing producers, and these
differences carry particular market and geopolitical implica-
tions.
Spare Capacity, Oil Market, and Geopolitics
The techniques and economics involved in conventional
oil production have historically set high barriers to the de-
velopment of excess capacity. However, some conventional
producers nevertheless left some oil fields idle and ready for
resuming production on short notice, thereby maintaining
a pool of spare production capacity. The cost of doing
so was considerable. In addition to significant sunk costs,
leaving oil fields idle incurred a substantial opportunity
cost of not selling oil at maximum capacity. In addition,
maintenance allegedly cost Saudi Arabia $100–500 million
per year about two decades ago (Bahgat 2001) and it is
likely be higher today.
If so costly, why is spare capacity created in the first place?
It sometimes emerges by accident rather than design. For
instance, many oil fields in such places as Iran, Libya, and
Venezuela ceased production at various points due to ex-
ogenous events such as sanctions, war, and civil unrest and
thus involuntarily became an excess capacity. However, the
political contexts limit the accessibility of this excess capac-
ity, meaning it cannot swing the market.
Most excess capacity has been created and run inten-
tionally. A chief purpose of swinging the market with spare
capacity is to keep the oil price stable and uncompetitive.
The reinforced price stability serves oil producers with
a large market share and large proven reserves because
it enhances the reliability of oil as a resource commodity,
delays the development of alternative energy, and ultimately
prolongs the world’s dependence on oil. The uncompetitive
market ensures an accumulation of huge rents to large oil
producers. Unsurprisingly, all historical swing producers
were dominant producers who held large shares of proven
reserves. The TRC, the first oil cartel consisting of US
domestic oil producers, acted as a swing producer from the
1930s to the 1960s by regulating production quotas on oil
wells in Texas and Oklahoma, thereby keeping some oil
fields idle (McNally 2017). These two states were in control
of 55 percent of US domestic production in 1927, while
the TRC and the Seven Sisters controlled approximately
95 percent of global crude production and 90 percent of
global reserves in 1948 (McNally 2017, 67, 109). Saudi Ara-
bia replaced the TRC as a new swing producer in the 1970s
when the latter could no longer meet the soaring domestic
demand. Saudi Arabia is similarly a giant oil producer, the
largest exporter and holder of the largest proven reserves
for the most part since the 1970s.
In addition to a long-term interest in protecting mar-
ket share, the speed and rate at which production volume
is dialed up or down also hinge on the degree of cen-
tralization of decision-making. Centralization is built on a
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combination of factors such as a centralized body that de-
cides the use of excess capacity, norms that regulate member
producers, and rules that punish violations. Such cohesive-
ness is achieved either when a single state or country (like
Saudi Arabia) regulates, controls, and owns all relevant ex-
cess capacity or when a group of producers agree to create
a centralized body, either formal or informal, to make deci-
sions about excess capacity (as in the TRC). The mutually
accepted rules and norms, in turn, create shadow of future
under which supply quotas are allocated and enforced and
cheating practices are discouraged. In short, the existence
of an adjustable supply must be accompanied by “supply reg-
ulation or cartelization of some form … [to be] effective at
imposing the stability” (McNally 2017, 110).
Given that oil is vital to macroeconomic performance and
military mobility, the ability to stabilize the price, enabled
by the existence of spare capacity run by a cohesive group
that commands a large market share, has come, historically,
with significant geopolitical leverage in great power poli-
tics. When a great power itself possesses spare capacity, it
acquires additional room for strategic maneuver over issues
and events that involve oil producers. For instance, during
the Suez Crisis of 1956, which disrupted delivery routes for
Persian Gulf oil, the United States was able to compel Britain
and France to withdraw from Egypt partly with its condi-
tional promise of an emergency oil supply program. Once
the withdrawal was complete, the TRC, despite some inter-
nal opposition, ultimately provided a highly effective “Oil
Lift” to relieve Europe of its oil shortage until the Suez Canal
was opened again for tanker traffic in March 1957 (Yergin
2008, 473–77). Washington was similarly able to prepare for
and absorb a supply shock during the Six-Day War in 1967
when TRC intervention rendered an Arab oil embargo ef-
fectively a failure by making up 1.0 mb/d out of the 1.5
mb/d lost by the production cut by Arab producers (Yergin
2008, 536–40). The possibility of a geopolitical crisis trig-
gering an oil shortage was “like a recurring bad dream” to
Washington (Yergin 2008, 538). In that regard, spare capac-
ity was a “valuable national security asset” that created more
room for statecraft and reduced the economic risks involved
(McNally 2017, 100).
Spare capacity located outside great powers, on the other
hand, incentivizes the formation of a “petro-alignment,”
or quid pro quo arrangement, whereby great powers of-
fer security in exchange for oil states’ friendly oil policies
(Kim 2019). US–Saudi relations epitomize such security-for-
spare-capacity relations. This emerged when Saudi Arabia
emerged as a replacement swing producer in the early 1970s
and Washington increasingly relied on Riyadh’s friendly
market intervention. The new market realities deepened
Riyadh–Washington ties in the following years—Saudi Ara-
bia undertook market stabilization interventions during
unanticipated supply disruptions such as the 1979–1980 oil
shock, the First Gulf War in 1990–1991, and the 2011 Libya
crisis (Gholz and Press 2010; IMF 2013), and the United
States reciprocated Saudi Arabia’s willingness to bear the
costs of running spare capacity and to release it in times of
crisis with a variety of forms of security assistance and as-
surance, effectively amounting to a security guarantee (Kim
2019).
Through the TRC and Saudi Arabia, the oil market has
depended on the presence of swing producers of various
kinds for most of the twentieth century and continues to
do so today. Although spare capacity is far from perfect,
friendly spare capacity, domestic or foreign, allows more lat-
itude for US grand strategy by lowering the economic costs
and strategic risks of oil supply disruptions. The location,
amount, and reliability of spare capacity have been, there-
fore, closely tied to the implementation of US foreign pol-
icy in managing the geopolitics of the Middle East, handling
oil-dependent allies in Europe and Asia, and generally rein-
forcing its global prestige as a hegemon.
Shale Oil and New Market Realities
Historically, swing producers have tended to act upon
shared commitments to protect their large market shares
and preserve the world’s reliance on oil as well as its ability
to act in a cooperative manner. Barring political complica-
tions, such conditions havemade them relatively predictable
and reliable.
Shale producers are just the opposite. Representing ap-
proximately 8 percent of global daily production volume to-
day, the share of shale producers is nowhere close to that
assumed by swing producers in the past. Additionally, their
chief business rationale is to optimize the timing with which
they activate DUCs and thereby maximize their short-term
business returns, not to prolong the world’s long-term ap-
petite for oil. Unlike traditional swing producers, shale oil
producers lack any authority to enforce cooperation on the
use of excess capacity. They are neither organized under a
set of rules and norms that regulate their production deci-
sions, as was the TRC, nor dominated by a hegemonic pro-
ducer such as Saudi Arabia in OPEC. Rather, this new form
of spare capacity is operated by a group of uncoordinated,
small-sized producers who are driven by short-term profit.
Two market implications can be inferred. First, shale
oil producers are unlikely to respond to short-term supply
shocks as promptly and effectively as Saudi Arabia and the
TRC. Possession of excess capacity is not the same as willing-
ness to release it in times of crisis. Unlike earlier swing pro-
ducers, shale oil producers are prevented by industry struc-
ture and production conditions from undertaking coherent
and prompt market interventions. Firms need time to assess
the costs and risks involved in turning DUCs to production
mode. In the case of sudden supply disruptions, therefore, a
release of excess capacity in the immediate term is likely to
be undertaken only by those producers that face the lowest
cost in resuming production, the most risk-acceptant firms,
and those with immediate financial flow needs.
To complicate the matter further, shale oil reservoirs
are hardly uniform in terms of geological conditions, the
volume of accessible reserves, infrastructural support, and
other relevant conditions—a combination that determines
cost structures across shale oil reservoirs. The huge amount
of heterogeneity across detection, development, extraction,
and delivery conditions makes a uniform response even less
likely, as the optimal time and amount of excess capacity to
release vary across firms.
Lastly, swing producers lack a centralized authority or
institution to make decisions regarding the utilization of
DUCs or the digging of new wells; instead, production
decisions are made at the level of the individual firm. Such
challenges are not new. The TRC also initially resembled
“a Roman senate of numerous, competing self-interests”
(McNally 2017, 73), thanks to the presence of small local
producers seeking short-term profits and the variation in
production conditions. It was only able to facilitate the con-
trol of production volumes by states through the creation of
the Interstate Oil Compact Commission in 1935 (McNally
2017, 72–82). No comparable institution is incipient in the
shale oil industry today. A swift, sustained, and sizable inter-
vention to neutralize unforeseen supply disruptions is highly
unlikely, nor should the market anticipate such action.
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Second, shale oil producers provide a more durable
buffer against medium-term and structural shocks than tradi-
tional swing producers. Medium-term and structural shocks
usually occur with sustained increases in demand, to which
comparable amounts of supply must be injected on a sus-
tained basis. The requirement for sustained supply presents
a more daunting challenge than short-term supply shocks,
which range from a loss of 1.5 to 2.0 mb/d and last less than
six months (Beccue et al. 2018). Accordingly, the release of a
relatively small amount of excess supply for a limited period
is usually sufficient to offset the shock.
In contrast, against medium-term and structural shifts in
demand, conventional excess capacity has been unable to of-
fer a credible and capable buffer. The demise of the TRC’s
excess capacity in 1971 was a result of the TRC’s failure to
keep up with decades-long and ongoing demand growth in
the Western industrialized economies. More recently, in the
context of sustained growth in demand in China and In-
dia, which accounts for approximately 50 percent of new de-
mand in the 2000s,6 Saudi Arabia’s excess capacity did little
to alleviate the demand, resulting in a steady price increase
through the 2000s. Developing fresh spare capacity from un-
developed reservoirs takes years to build and requires large
sums of sunk costs. The estimated volume of spare capacity,
which is mostly located in idle fields in Saudi Arabia, is rela-
tively modest, standing at around 0.5–2.0 mb/d (Beccue et
al. 2018). Its stabilization capacity is, accordingly, limited to
short-term crises. As Saudi Energy Minister Khalid Al-Falih
acknowledged,
… history has also demonstrated that [OPEC] inter-
vention in response to structural shifts is largely inef-
fective … That’s why Saudi Arabia does not support
OPEC intervening to alleviate the impacts of long-
term structural imbalances, as opposed to addressing
short-term aberrations … (Reuters 2017)
On the other hand, shale oil is likely capable of sustain-
ing a larger and longer production increase and therefore
balancing the market in the medium term (IEA 2017a,
47–48). Its intervention capacity is based on two sources.
One is the activation of DUCs, which on average takes less
than a month to deliver commercial oil to the market.
Wood Mackenzie, an energy consulting firm, forecasted in
2016 that 1,700 DUCs could turn into 250,000 b/d (Garrett
2016). If one applies this calculation mechanically to the
number of DUCs today, which in July 2019 stood at over
16,000, spare capacity from DUCs would be approximately
just below 2.5 mb/d. This is a conservative estimate, and the
actual figure may be higher due to an advancing drilling
technique that reaches deeper and wider as well as to the
lower cost of shale oil well development (Zeihan 2016,
37–42).
A more important source for medium-term response is
likely to come from undrilled shale reserves, estimated in
North America alone to hold 117 billion barrels. While
it is fair to assume that only a fraction of this reserve can
be turned into production mode, it is not unreasonable
to expect that the recoverable shale oil and produc-
tion volume is likely to continue rising in the future.
As figure 3 suggests, DUCs are on the rise and, more im-
portantly, rapidly advancing shale technology is reportedly
expanding the volume of technically recoverable shale oil
reserves. In fact, shale oil production has been rising faster
6Author’s calculation from British Petroleum Company (2019). Between 2000
and 2010, global demand increased by 10.9 mb/d, of which 5.6 mb was from
China and India.
than anticipated. Its production volume was 7 mb/d in
November 2018, surpassing the IEA’s initial projection of
4.7–5.0 mb/d made only a year before (IEA 2017a, 47). It
is now expected to be close to 9 mb/d in September 2019.
With the supreme speed in developing wells, shale oil can
build up production capacity in larger and more prompt
manner compared to conventional oil in times of price
increases.
While the intra-industry heterogeneity in shale produc-
tion conditions makes the swift and sizable short-term
response of a cohesive group of producers an unlikely sce-
nario, the intra-industry variation flattens over time and, in
the medium term, the shale industry’s technical advantages
and the lower economic barriers to swift entry become dom-
inant factors in the shale firms’ behaviors. Furthermore, a
medium-term demand increase is usually not a one-time
occurrence but rather a persistent phenomenon stemming
from larger trends in the global economy. The longer,
though by no means certain, prospect of price increase
is more likely to tempt shale oil producers to consider
increasing their production volume. Spare capacity, as a
result, could develop into a larger and more sustainable
buffer in the medium term due to the larger available pool
of shale reserves, the technical feasibility of producing more
promptly, and a relatively lower proportion of sunk costs.
Overall, shale oil lowers the medium-term price ceiling
but does not eliminate short-term price volatility. Together
with its large reserves, shale oil introduces a higher level
of responsiveness to supply shortages compared with the
market dominated by highly inelastic conventional oil. The
price volatility problem remains, however, because uncoor-
dinated and heterogeneous shale oil producers take longer
to respond to supply shortages than centralized and partly
politically motivated Saudi Arabia.
Oil Geopolitics under Shale Oil?
Spare capacity resides in two separate regions today—Saudi
Arabia in the Persian Gulf and shale producers in North
America. The geographical locations aside, the two also
fundamentally differ in terms of the speed, amount, and
sustainability of their stabilization capacity. The new market
realities paint a nuanced picture of the geopolitics of oil.
First of all, US foreign policy can benefit from shale
producers’ swinging action but cannot count on their
intervention to be timely and sufficient. On the one hand,
the shale industry strengthens the US stance against states
capable of disrupting the global oil supply chain if the
disruption coincides with the shale boom. For instance, the
shale boom lent much needed credibility and effectiveness
to the 2012 sanctions against Iran, as, almost by sheer
serendipity, the newly added shale oil neutralized the loss of
Iranian oil. The world’s symmetric vulnerability to Iranian
oil quickly vanished, affecting the confidence with which
Iranian supreme leader Khamenei could initially insist
that “continuing these sanctions for a long time is not in
the interest of western countries” (Maloney 2014). Shale
oil shattered this economic logic and allowed the United
States to “put the squeeze on Iran without disrupting the
global market or jacking up the price” (Philips 2013). The
shale boom turned what was initially a questionable regime
of sanctions into a more sustainable, more crushing, and
overall more effective act of statecraft, contributing to the
conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in
2015 (Kim and Lee 2019, 105–6).
Available evidence, however, strongly suggests that such
intervention occurred by accident, not design. The shale
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boom of early 2014 was the outcome of a sustained price
increase a decade earlier, which first rationalized aggressive
research into fracking technology and then made shale oil
production commercially viable. Other business conditions
contributed, too. Some analysts pointed out that the quick
increase in shale oil production in the 2010s was due in part
to the preceding shale gas boom in 2004–2008. Shale oil and
gas use the same drilling rigs and fracking equipment, and
therefore, almost by accident, the interchangeable gas fa-
cilities reduced technical and cost barriers to the drilling
of shale oil wells (Kleinberg et al. 2018, 77). Overall, the
decades-long history of innovation and the inheritance of
shale gas facilities account for shale oil’s sudden entry and
its accelerating increase of volume, and there is no evidence
to suggest that the Unites States’ 2012 sanctions against Iran
were what drove shale oil producers to pump up more oil.
The shale boom quickly making up the lost Iranian
barrels, therefore, does not contradict the new market re-
ality in which shale producers are unwilling and incapable
short-term price stabilizers. What it means is that shale
oil can create a powerful buffer and expand room for US
strategic maneuver vis-à-vis oil states only if a next round of
increase in shale oil production accidentally coincides with
an unanticipated geopolitical disruption. Needless to say,
such coincidence can be neither pre-arranged nor reason-
ably expected. In usual circumstances, therefore, disparate
and independent shale producers cannot be factored in to
supplement US foreign policy.
Only under exceptional circumstances will the federal
government be able to garner sufficient public and indus-
trial support to regulate shale producers and fully utilize
their spare capacity. A full-scale war is a possible candidate
for such a situation. For instance, in 1942 the United States
was able to establish the controversial Petroleum Adminis-
tration for War (PAW) and forcefully exercised an extensive
regulatory power over an unenthusiastic domestic oil indus-
try. In the end, the PAW was instrumental in meeting the sky-
rocketing wartime oil requirements by increasing domestic
oil production from 3.8 mb/d in 1941 to almost 4.7 mb/d
by 1945, thereby supplying 6 billion of the 7 billion barrels
of oil consumed by the United States and its allies in 1941–
1945 (Clayton 2015, 70–3). Oil is still the predominant fuel
source for today’s military. In the event of a larger or longer
war than planned, Washingtonmight be similarly compelled
to arrange a measure or an organization comparable to the
PAW. In such a rare but crushing event, the ample reserves
of shale spare capacity under the Washington’s regulation
could prove to be of exceptional national security value and
could significantly lessen the burden of securing one of the
most challenging wartime logistical requirements.
While shale oil producers can dial up the production
promptly, they are also one of the first producers to cease
productions and leave the market during a price collapse
because their variable and production costs run higher than
most conventional producers. When the United States was
the largest oil importer, its petro-diplomacy objective was to
keep the oil price low and stable. Now as a major producer
today, it is being compelled to reconfigure its foreign eco-
nomic policies to keep an oil price high enough to prevent
mass closures of shale business to which millions of jobs are
attached. For instance, in the midst of the oil price plunge
in April 2020, President Trump actively engaged in forging a
production cut deal of 10 mb/d between Saudi Arabia and
Russia to shore up the oil price and rescue its ailing shale
industry (Wang et al. 2020), a new type of petro-diplomacy
that was hardly imaginable barely a decade ago.
Second, Saudi Arabia’s market power and strategic value
is unlikely to diminish to the extent many pundits specu-
lated it would after the advent of shale oil. The new mar-
ket realities are that Riyadh is still the only producer capa-
ble of swiftly releasing sizable spare capacity. The Kingdom
of Saud controls a clear chain of command that runs from
the Ministry of Petroleum to its national oil company, Saudi
Aramco. Saudi Arabian policy regarding whether, when, and
how to release its spare capacity is likely to be more or less
coherent and consistent with the business and strategic ob-
jectives of the government. In contrast, the US federal gov-
ernment has no control over the American oil industry, and
the industry’s business interests are not necessarily aligned
with the President’s foreign policy agenda. As a heteroge-
neous group of price-takers, they lack any ability to aggre-
gate themselves and move markets for any ends, including
geopolitical ones (Gross 2018). Shale industry’s spare capac-
ity is simply not configured to be a reliable resource for US
economic statecraft, and, therefore, Saudi Arabia retains its
unique influence on the market. The fundamentals of the
decades-long strategic exchange of security and oil with the
United States remain undisturbed.
Recent interactions between the United States and Saudi
Arabia are broadly consistent with such expectations. On al-
most all occasions on which the United States faced upward
price pressure from the Persian Gulf, President Trump ap-
pealed to Saudi Arabia and not the domestic shale oil in-
dustry for additional oil. When the United States pulled out
from the Iran Nuclear Deal in May 2018, for instance, Presi-
dent Trump openly urged Saudi Arabia to “increase oil pro-
duction, maybe up to 2,000,000 barrels” (Trump 2018) to
make up for the loss of Iranian oil supply. Similarly, in April
2019, the announcement that the sanction waivers given to
major importers of Iranian oil would be discontinued was
followed by a President Trump’s tweet asserting that Saudi
Arabia would “more than make up the oil flow difference
in our now full sanctions on Iranian oil” (Trump 2019).
Equally importantly, no corresponding requests were made
to its own domestic shale oil producers during the same pe-
riod. The non-case evidence is highly suggestive of Washing-
ton’s inability to induce an increase from the domestic in-
dustry and/or of shale oil’s unreliability as swing producers.
Saudi Arabia’s responses to US calls have been mixed.
On the one hand, Saudi Arabia boosted oil production in
accordance with the request. In 2018, following the Presi-
dent Trump’s urging, Saudi Arabia increased its oil produc-
tion from 10.1 mb/d in the second quarter to 11.1 mb/d
in November 2018 (OPEC 2018, 58), which arguably con-
tributed to the fall of the oil price from $70 in July to $50
by December. However, during the OPEC annual meeting
in December, Saudi Arabia changed its course of action by
agreeing to join an OPEC effort, together with Russia’s par-
ticipation, to cut production by 1.5 mb/d (Reed 2018). The
defiance resulted, apparently, from Riyadh’s frustration that
the United States allowed major consumers to continue im-
porting oil from Iran.
Saudi reaction since then has been more nuanced. When
Washington ended the sanction waivers for importing
Iranian oil in April 2019, Saudi Arabia openly denied
President Trump’s assertion that Saudi Arabia had agreed
on a production increase, reportedly citing a concern
about oversupplying the market. At other times, it signaled
flexibility about “encouraging the OPEC Plus to ease the
voluntary limits … and to increase supplies to ensure that
there is no unnecessary tightening in the market.” (Khalid
al-Falih, quoted in Turak 2019).
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/isq/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isq/sqaa042/5866005 by Singapore M
anagem
ent U
niversity user on 08 July 2020
INWOOK KIM 11
The friendliness of Riyadh’s oil policy is far from guar-
anteed, and the policy is often limited in its effectiveness
to times of short-term supply shocks. Yet it represents one
of few credible options available against supply shocks,
and shale oil is unlikely to disrupt the historical relations
between Washington and Riyadh. The Strategic Petroleum
Reserve is another powerful deterrent, but its utilization is
often used only as a last resort in order to avoid causing
market anxiety (Critchlow 2019). Little has changed today.
Saudi Arabia recently announced a major investment ini-
tiative to boost its spare capacity (Oxford Business Group
2019), signifying that it is committed to maintaining its his-
torical role as a swing producer and enjoying the power that
role entails. The latest attacks on Abqaiq stabilization facility
and Khurais oil field in September 2019, which were ini-
tially reported to have caused a disruption up to 5.7 mb/d
production, similarly showed not only the high sensitivity of
oil price to production and spare capacity disruption, actual
or potential, originating in Saudi Arabia, but also Saudi Ara-
bia’s central role in recovering from the shock by utilizing its
own commercial stocks located in Egypt, the Netherlands,
and Japan to continue honoring oil export commitments
and to stabilize the global market so swiftly (Gupte 2019).
The nature of Washington’s commitment to Riyadh re-
mains fundamentally unaltered thus far. Tense moments oc-
casionally erupt, the killing of Jamal Khashoggi in October
2018 or the decision to flood the market with 2.5 mb/d ad-
ditional supply in March 2020 that hurt the highly prized
US shale industry being the latest examples. Such tensions
are hardly new in US–Saudi Arabia relations, however, and
the fact that the exchange of oil for security still appears ro-
bust suggests that the newmarket realities introduced by the
advent of shale oil have yet to overturn the old geopolitics
dictated by Saudi’s engineering of its excess capacity.
Third, what does the continued importance of Saudi Ara-
bia mean for the US military commitment to the Persian
Gulf? Recently, scholars and policymakers began to prob-
lematize the historical US objective of defending Persian
Gulf oil. There is a contingent in Washington that takes
the view that the shale boom is making the United States
energy-secure and consequently accelerating an American
disengagement from world politics (Zeihan 2016). As noted
above, however, the global market logic in which the US
shale industry is embedded is such that the United States
remains vulnerable to global supply disruptions. Accord-
ingly, others have called for honoring the Carter Doctrine
through continuing US military presence in order to keep
the region and the global oil market stable (Krane and
Medlock 2018, 559–61).
On the surface, my analysis seems to favor a continued US
military presence for the market and the geopolitical un-
derpinnings of US–Saudi relations remain unaltered. The
argument about the irreplaceability of Saudi Arabia’s mar-
ket power, however, does not and should not imply opposi-
tion to US withdrawal. First of all, although the short-term
volatility problem endures, shale oil nevertheless offers a
new cushion against medium-term market volatility. While
only time will tell how much the medium-term cushion mat-
ters in US foreign policy, it is not unreasonable to expect
that it will lessen the strategic risks and uncertainty that
plagued US foreign policy in the pre-shale era, thereby cre-
ating some latitude in how the United States handles issues
involving the possibility of oil supply disruptions. And if the
medium-term price ceiling is believed to be resilient, stable,
and relatively easily restorable, the argument for US pres-
ence could potentially weaken to such an extent that the
new market realities dilute both the substantive and sym-
bolic market power of Saudi Arabia.
More importantly, even if shale’s medium-term swinging
capacity matters little, what my analysis means at most is
that the argument for reducing the US military commit-
ment cannot be based on the shale boom. There are al-
ready plenty of lines of logic for reconsidering the US mil-
itary commitment to the region that do not depend on
the prospering domestic oil industry (Glaser and Kelanic
2016), including the idea that security threats are exagger-
ated (Talmadge 2008; Shifrinson and Priebe 2011); the no-
tion that the oil market has effective adaptive mechanisms
to withstand supply shocks (Gholz and Press 2010); the ar-
gument that US withdrawal promises cost savings on a larger
scale from what is conventionally believed (Gholz 2016); the
idea that lower oil prices reduce the likelihood of conflicts
(Hendrix 2017); and the suggestion that a scaled-down US
military posture could still meet the security requirements
(Rovner and Talmadge 2014). That shale oil cannot func-
tion as a replacement short-term swing producer does not
alter the basis of any of these arguments. Simply put, the
debate for and against US military presence in the Persian
Gulf would do well not to factor the shale boom as a primary
variable in their calculus.
Fourth, US spare capacity from shale oil affects the strate-
gic calculus of other major powers, too.7 The more resilient
medium-term price ceiling benefits oil-importing great
powers. China, the largest oil importer, is a case in point.
Thanks to a new age of oil abundance and a medium-term
stability, China may see energy security as a lesser challenge
than it seemed to be when the rising oil price and tight-
ening global supply forced China to engage in its highly
controversial and costly “going-out” diplomacy during the
2000s. Oil’s greater availability at a cheaper price also gen-
erally helps China’s economic performance by lowering the
input costs for its energy-intensive industry. Moreover, the
lower oil price frees huge sums of finance—according to
one estimate, the $59 drop in oil price between June 2014
and December 2016 saved China roughly $400 million daily
(O’Sullivan 2017, 220).
While shale oil benefits the Chinese economy and
finance, its geopolitical impact is more qualified and
contingent. On the one hand, the age of oil abundance
allows China to rely on market over state intervention to
secure oil supply. As a result, in the sense that China is no
longer bound by its prior commitment to overly protect
oil-rich partners, shale oil arguably unlocks “a greater de-
gree of freedom” for Chinese foreign policy (Downs 2013;
O’Sullivan 2017, 212).
Some have speculated about the possibility of China’s
geopolitical ambitions reaching to the Middle East in the
event of US withdrawal from the region (Levi 2013, 78). This
possibility, however, is conditional upon actual, complete US
withdrawal and China’s development of sufficient military
power projection capability, neither of which appears immi-
nent. China is also well aware of the costs and risks involved
and therefore unlikely to undertake an effort to unseat the
United States and fill in the geopolitical gap in the Middle
East itself. Under the shale boom, China enjoys the public
good of cheaper oil and a thicker cushion against supply dis-
ruption but is unlikely to be tempted to expand its geopolit-
ical footprint (Daojiong and Meidan 2015).
Russia, in contrast, faces an opposite situation. As a major
petrostate that relies heavily on the oil industry, it is one of
7One major actor in the geopolitics of oil that I do not examine is OPEC. For
an excellent discussion of the future of OPEC, see Van de Graaf (2017).
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the greatest losers in the shale boom, having severely suf-
fered from the price collapse since 2015. To make matters
worse, the medium-term price ceiling has been set below the
level necessary for Russia to balance its budget. These chal-
lenges are severe, and short-term measures to address the
impact, such as using up its stabilization fund, allowing the
free floating of the exchange rate, or even printing more
money, are limited and entail longer term problems. As the
oil price collapsed down to $20/b in April 2020, the con-
ditions surrounding state finance and socioeconomic man-
agement are likely to continue deteriorating for Moscow
who needs $42/b to balance its budget (Griffin 2020).
Furthermore, unlike in China, where oil plays a minor
part in the geopolitical calculus, oil is central to Russia’s
political governance, regime legitimacy, and foreign policy,
a typical feature of petrostates. For Russian foreign policy,
the US shale boom is turning out to be a liability because
the lower medium-term price ceiling and diversification of
oil and gas sources enhance the market’s tolerance to the
consequences of Russia’s energy diplomacy. A growing sense
of oil abundance reinforced the US and EU sanctions over
the 2014 Ukrainian crisis, preventing foreign investment in
its upstream sectors, especially the Arctic offshore and shale
projects (EIA 2017); the age of energy abundance reduced
Russia’s oil and gas leverage vis-à-vis China, increased its
dependence on the Chinese market, and diminished its in-
fluence over Central Asia in light of China’s Belt and Road
Initiative (O’Sullivan 2017, 201–5). Others see a mixed
prospect. In 2016, Russia and Saudi Arabia formed the
so-called OPEC Plus, a cooperative arrangement to control
their oil production policy. After three years of cooperation,
the marriage of convenience fell apart in March 2020 over
a disagreement on the size of production cuts, but the
two eventually agreed on a combined production cut of
10 mb/d in April to counter the demand collapse. The
current fragility certainly casts doubt on the prospect
of the OPEC Plus being a cohesive cartel arrangement.
Nevertheless, the Moscow’s unexpected partnership with
Riyadh, if revived, may help reinvigorate Russia’s diplomatic
engagement with the region.
Overall, careful examination suggests that the effects of
shale show that the shale boom alone will be insufficient to
disturb the fundamental pillars of the post-1970s geopolitics
of oil. This comes as little surprise. Numerous studies show
that oil’s effects on politics are rarely independent but are,
rather, deeply embedded in the complex web of broader en-
ergy, political, strategic, and market conditions (Ross 2015;
Meierding 2016). Shale oil is no exception. The advent of
shale oil may alter but does not revolutionize the geopoli-
tics of oil.
Future Research
Thanks to the recent revival of interest in the politics of
oil, our knowledge concerning the causality, conditions, and
consequences of the politics of oil has vastly expanded. How-
ever, the literature still generally suffers from a lack of in-
depth understanding about what really matters in the oil
industry—firms’ motives, cost structure, industrial structure,
market logic, and technical specifications. Instead, relevant
information is exogenously given, assumed to remain con-
stant, crudely simplified, or even entirely absent. This pa-
per highlights the importance of repairing this illiteracy and
updating the literature in light of shale oil’s entry into the
market to help navigate how changing market realities will
shape the geopolitics of oil in the future.
Admittedly, US foreign policy and grand strategy consti-
tutes only a fraction of the field of interests affected by the
shale boom. Furthermore, how the geopolitics of shale oil
will unfold also depends heavily on a complex interaction
of myriad interdependent issue areas. I highlight two such
areas that could be followed up in future research. One is
an emerging interest in the development of large-scale shale
production outside North America. Despite the many al-
ready identified large deposits of shale oil in countries such
as China, Russia, and Argentina (EIA 2013), no meaningful
shale industry has yet emerged because technical, geologi-
cal, financial, and infrastructure support is not readily avail-
able outside the United States (Levi 2013, 32–3). This is far
from given, however, in a rapidly changing shale oil industry.
More importantly, the non-US shale oil industry may well op-
erate under different rules of business. For instance, in some
places the industry might be directed under state authority,
which then could compel prompt production, or the num-
ber of shale firms could become so large that the number
of producers capable of swift response would be sufficient
to neutralize a small-scale supply shock. Future studies can
examine how the speed of diffusion, actors, locations, and
amount of shale oil extraction outside the United States
affect the way the shale boom shapes the geopolitics of oil.
Another is the implications of the continuing replace-
ment of oil and gas by alternative energy sources. Although
oil still remains a dominant fuel source, analysts find that de-
velopment of and cost-saving measures related to renewable
energy have made more rapid advances than initially antic-
ipated and that such a trend is irreversible (International
Renewable Energy Agency 2019). Environmental concerns
about the shale boom due to a continued reliance on hy-
drocarbon or the use of fracking technology are also of high
public and policy relevance and may affect the shale indus-
try. The declining rate at which oil demand is projected to
increase, labeled under an idea of peak demand, further
complicates the future of the energy market and the pol-
itics of oil (Van de Graaf 2017). The interplay of relevant
conditions for the ongoing energy transition away from hy-
drocarbon accordingly promises a fruitful avenue for future
research that holds high relevance for both policy and the-
ory related to the deeply intertwined relations between oil
and politics.
References
ADELMAN, M. A. 1984. “International Oil Agreements.” The Energy Journal 5
(3): 1–9.
ANSARI, DAWUD. 2017. “OPEC, Saudi Arabia, and the Shale Revolution:
Insights from EquilibriumModelling andOil Politics.” Energy Policy 111
(December): 166–78.
BACHMEIER, LANCE J., AND JAMES M. GRIFFIN. 2006. “Testing for Market Inte-
gration Crude Oil, Coal, and Natural Gas.” The Energy Journal 27 (2):
55–71.
BAHGAT, GAWDAT. 2001. “Managing Dependence: American–Saudi Oil Rela-
tions.” Arab Studies Quarterly 23 (1): 1–14.
BAUMEISTER, CHRISTIANE, AND LUTZ KILIAN. 2016. “Understanding the Decline
in the Price of Oil Since June 2014.” Journal of the Association of Environ-
mental and Resource Economists 3 (1): 131–58.
BECCUE, PHILLIP C., HILLARD G. HUNTINGTON, PAUL N. LEIBY, AND KENNETH R.
VINCENT. 2018. “An Updated Assessment of Oil Market Disruption
Risks.” Energy Policy 115 (April): 456–69.
BJORNLAND, HILDE, FRODE MARTIN NORDVIK, AND MAXIMILIAN ROHRER. 2017.
“Supply Flexibility in the Shale Patch: Evidence from North
Dakota.” Working Paper, Norges Bank Research. https://www.norges-
bank.no/en/Published/Papers/Working-Papers/2017/92017/.
BORNSTEIN, GIDEON, PER KRUSELL, AND SERGIO REBELO. 2017. Lags, Costs,
and Shocks: An Equilibrium Model of the Oil Industry. NBER Working
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/isq/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isq/sqaa042/5866005 by Singapore M
anagem
ent U
niversity user on 08 July 2020
INWOOK KIM 13
Paper No. 23423, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge,
MA.
BRITISH PETROLEUM COMPANY. 2019. BP Statistical Review of World Energy.
London: British Petroleum Company.
CLAYTON, BLAKE C. 2015. Market Madness: A Century of Oil Panics, Crises, and
Crashes. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
COLGAN, JEFF D. 2014. “The Emperor Has No Clothes: The Limits of OPEC
in the Global Oil Market.” International Organization 68 (3): 599–632.
COLGAN, JEFF D., AND THIJS VAN DE GRAAF. 2017. “A Crude Reversal: The
Political Economy of the United States CrudeOil Export Policy.” Energy
Research & Social Science 24 (February): 30–5.
COLLINS, GABRIEL, AND KENNETH MEDLOCK III. 2017. “Assessing Shale Produc-
ers’ Ability to Scale-up Activity.” Issue Brief, Baker Institute for Public
Policy, Rice University.
CRITCHLOW, ANDREW. 2019. “Trump Won’t Gamble with US Strategic Oil
Stocks Despite Supply Disruption Risks.” S&P Global Platts, May
28. https://blogs.platts.com/2019/05/28/trump-gamble-strategic-oil-
stocks/.
CROOKS, ED. 2015. “The US Shale Revolution.” Financial Times,
April 24. https://www.ft.com/content/2ded7416-e930-11e4-a71a-
00144feab7de.
DAOJIONG, ZHA, AND MICHAL MEIDAN. 2015. China and the Middle East in a New
Energy Landscape. London: Chatham House.
DEUTCH, JOHN, JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, AND DAVID G. VICTOR. 2006. National Secu-
rity Consequences of U.S. Oil Dependency. New York: Council on Foreign
Relations.
DOWNIE, CHRISTIAN. 2019. Business Battles in the US Energy Sector: Lessons for a
Clean Energy Transition. Abingdon: Routledge.
DOWNS, ERICA. 2013. “Implications of the U.S. Shale Energy Revolu-
tion for China.” The Brookings Institution, November 8. https://
www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2013/11/08/implications-of-the-
u-s-shale-energy-revolution-for-china/.
EIA. 2011. Performance Profiles of Major Energy Producers 2009. DOE/EIA-
0206(09). Washington, DC: US Energy Information Administration.
_____. 2013. “Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources Are Globally Abun-
dant.” Today in Energy, June 10. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/
detail.php?id=11611.
_____. 2016. “Trends in U.S. Oil and Natural Gas Upstream Costs.” EIA.
https://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/drilling/.
_____. 2017. “Russia.” October 31. https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/
analysis.php?iso=RUS.
_____. 2018a. “Oil: Crude and Petroleum Products Explained.” EIA.
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/print.php?page=oil_prices.
_____. 2018b. “The United States Is Now the Largest Global Crude Oil
Producer.” Today in Energy, EIA. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/
detail.php?id=37053.
_____. 2018c. “Drilling Productivity Report.” Petroleum Reports, EIA.
https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/drilling/.
_____. 2019a. “Time Between Drilling and First Production Has Little
Effect on Oil Well Production.” Today in Energy, September 10.
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=41253.
_____. 2019b. “Short-Term Energy Outlook.” EIA. https://www.eia.
gov/outlooks/steo/archives/nov19.pdf.
GARRETT, JONATHAN. 2016. “US Shale: Winning in a Volatile Environ-
ment.” Wood Mackenzie. https://www.spegcs.org/media/files/files/
759d9ea6/US_Shale_Winning_in_a_Volatile_Environment_WSG_
October_19_2016_l97Zzmt.pdf.
GHOLZ, EUGENE. 2016. “US Spending on Its Military Commitments to the Per-
sian Gulf.” In Crude Strategy: Rethinking the US Military Commitment to
Defend Persian Gulf Oil, edited by Charles L. Glaser and Rosemary A.
Kelanic. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
GHOLZ, EUGENE, AND DARYL G. PRESS. 2010. “Protecting ‘The Prize’: Oil and
the U.S. National Interest.” Security Studies 19 (3): 453–85.
GLASER, CHARLES L. 2013. “How Oil Influences U.S. National Security.” Inter-
national Security 38 (2): 112–46.
Charles L. Glaser and Rosemary A. Kelanic, eds. 2016. Crude Strategy: Rethink-
ing the US Military Commitment to Defend Persian Gulf Oil. Washington,
DC: Georgetown University Press.
GOLDMAN SACHS. n.d. “‘The New Oil Order’—Making Sense of an In-
dustry’s Transformation.” https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/
pages/the-new-oil-order/.
GRIFFIN, ROSEMARY. 2020. “Russia to Join OPEC+ Conference Call Planned
for April 6: Novak.” S&P Global Platts, April 3. https://www.
spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/oil/040320-
russia-to-join-opec-conference-call-planned-for-april-6-novak.
GROSS, SAMANTHA. 2018. “Is the United States the New Saudi Arabia?”
The Brookings Institution, January 26. https://www.brookings.edu/
blog/order-from-chaos/2018/01/26/is-the-united-states-the-new-
saudi-arabia/.
GUPTE, EKLAVYA. 2019. “Factbox: Crude Prices Surge as Saudi Attacks Ex-
pose Lack of Global Spare Capacity.” S&P Global Platts, September.
https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/
oil/091619-factbox-crude-prices-surge-as-saudi-attacks-expose-lack-of-
global-spare-capacity.
HENDRIX, CULLEN S. 2017. “Oil Prices and Interstate Conflict.” Conflict Man-
agement and Peace Science 34 (6): 575–96.
HUGHES, LLEWELYN, AND AUSTIN LONG. 2015. “Is There an Oil Weapon? Secu-
rity Implications of Changes in the Structure of the International Oil
Market.” International Security 39 (3): 152–89.
IEA. 2017a. “Oil 2017. Market Report Series: Oil.” IEA. https://doi.org/
10.1787/9789264272514-en.
_____. 2017b. “World Energy Outlook 2017.” IEA. https://doi.org/
10.1787/weo-2017-en.
IMF. 2013. “Saudi Arabia: Selected Issues.” IMF Country Report No. 13/230,
IMF. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13230.pdf.
INTERNATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY. 2019. “A New World: The
Geopolitics of the Energy Transformation.” https://www.irena.org/
publications/2019/Jan/A-New-World-The-Geopolitics-of-the-Energy-
Transformation.
KAISER, MARK J. 2012. “Profitability Assessment of Haynesville Shale Gas
Wells.” Energy 38 (1): 315–30.
KELANIC, ROSEMARY. 2012. Black Gold and Blackmail: The Politics of International
Oil Coercion. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago.
KILIAN, LUTZ. 2017. “How the Tight Oil BoomHas Changed Oil and Gasoline
Markets.” CEPR Discussion Paper No. 11876.
KIM, INWOOK. 2019. “A Crude Bargain: Great Powers, Oil States, and Petro-
Alignment.” Security Studies 28 (5): 833–69.
KIM, INWOOK, AND JUNG-CHUL LEE. 2019. “Sanctions for Nuclear Inhibition:
Comparing Sanction Conditions Between Iran and North Korea.”
Asian Perspective 43 (1): 95–122.
KLEINBERG, R. L., S. PALTSEV, C. K. E. EBINGER, D. A. HOBBS, AND
T. BOERSMA. 2018. “Tight Oil Market Dynamics: Benchmarks,
Breakeven Points, and Inelasticities.” Energy Economics 70 (February):
70–83.
KRANE, JIM, AND MARK AGERTON. 2015. “Effects of Low Oil Prices on
U.S. Shale Production: OPEC Calls the Tune and Shale Swings.”
Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice University. https://scholarship.
rice.edu/handle/1911/91278.
KRANE, JIM, AND KENNETH B. MEDLOCK. 2018. “Geopolitical Dimensions of US
Oil Security.” Energy Policy 114 (March): 558–65.
LEVI, MICHAEL. 2013. Power Surge: Energy, Opportunity, and the Battle for America’s
Future. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
MACALISTER, TERRY. 2015. “Shell Abandons Alaska Arctic Drilling.”
The Guardian, September 28. https://www.theguardian.com/
business/2015/sep/28/shell-ceases-alaska-arctic-drilling-exploratory-
well-oil-gas-disappoints.
MALONEY, SUZANNE. 2014. “Why ‘Iran Style’ Sanction Worked Against
Tehran.” Brookings. http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/
2014/03/21-iran-sanctions-russia-crimea-nuclear.
MCNALLY, ROBERT. 2017. Crude Volatility: The History and the Future of Boom–Bust
Oil Prices. New York: Columbia University Press.
MEIERDING, EMILY. 2016. “Dismantling the Oil Wars Myth.” Security Studies 25
(2): 258–88.
NEWELL, RICHARD G., AND BRIAN C. PREST. 2019. “The Unconventional Oil Sup-
ply Boom: Aggregate Price Response from Microdata.” The Energy Jour-
nal 40 (3): 1–30.
OPEC. 2018. “Monthly Oil Market Report.” OPEC. https://www.opec.org/
opec_web/en/publications/338.htm.
O’SULLIVAN, MEGHAN L. 2017. Windfall: How the New Energy Abundance Up-
ends Global Politics and Strengthens America’s Power. New York: Simon &
Schuster.
OXFORD BUSINESS GROUP. 2019. “Investments in Spare Energy Capacity
Aim to Protect Saudi Arabia from Future Oil and Gas Crises.” In The
Report: Saudi Arabia 2019. https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/analysis/
building-cushion-investments-spare-capacity-aim-protect-saudi-arabia-
future-oil-and-gas-crises.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/isq/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isq/sqaa042/5866005 by Singapore M
anagem
ent U
niversity user on 08 July 2020
14 Swinging Shale
PAINTER, D. S. 2012. “Oil and the American Century.” Journal of American His-
tory 99 (1): 24–39.
PHILIPS, MATTHEW. 2013. “There Would Be No Iranian Nuclear Talks
If Not for Fracking,” November 9. http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2013-11-08/there-would-be-no-iranian-nuclear-
talks-if-not-for-fracking.
QABAZARD, HASAN M., MARIO FANTINI, AND MICHAEL HADERER. 2013. I Need
to Know: An Introduction to the Oil Industry & OPEC. Austria:
OPEC.
REED, STANLEY. 2018. “OPEC and Allies, Defying Trump, Agree to
Cut Oil Output to Prop Up Prices.” The New York Times, De-
cember 7. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/07/business/energy-
environment/opec-russia-oil-prices-production.html.
REUTERS. 2017. “UPDATE 1-FULL TEXT-CERAWEEK-Saudi Energy Min-
ister Khalid Al-Falih’s Speech,” March 8. https://www.reuters.
com/article/ceraweek-saudi-speech-idUSL2N1GK132.
_____. 2020. “Analyst View: Oil Price Crash, What Next?” April 22.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-global-oil-analysts/analyst-
view-oil-price-crash-what-next-idUSKCN2233A9https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-global-oil-analysts/analyst-view-oil-price-crash-what-
next-idUSKCN2233A9.
ROSS, MICHAEL L. 2015. “What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse?”
Annual Review of Political Science 18 (1): 239–59.
ROVNER, JOSHUA, AND CAITLIN TALMADGE. 2014. “Hegemony, Force Posture, and
the Provision of Public Goods: The Once and Future Role of Out-
side Powers in Securing Persian Gulf Oil.” Security Studies 23 (3): 548–
81.
SHIFRINSON, JOSHUA R. ITZKOWITZ, AND MIRANDA PRIEBE. 2011. “A Crude Threat:
The Limits of an Iranian Missile Campaign Against Saudi Arabian Oil.”
International Security 36 (1): 167–201.
TALMADGE, CAITLIN. 2008. “Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian Threat
to the Strait of Hormuz.” International Security 33 (1): 82–
117.
THE WHITE HOUSE. 2015. “Remarks by the President in State of the Union
Address.” Office of the Press Secretary. https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/20/remarks-president-state-
union-address-january-20-2015.
_____. 2017. “Press Briefing by Secretary of Energy Rick Perry and Principal
Deputy Press Secretary Sarah Sanders.” Press Briefings. https://www.
whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/press-briefing-secretary-energy-
rick-perry-principal-deputy-press-secretary-sarah-sanders-062717/.
TRUMP, DONALD. 2018. “Just Spoke to King Salman …” Twitter, June 30.
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1013023608040513537.
_____. 2019. “Saudi Arabia and Others in OPEC …” Twitter, April 22.
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1120320642686038016.
TURAK, NATASHA. 2019. “Saudi Energy Minister Responds to Trump’s
Tweet That Said OPEC Should ‘Relax’.” CNBC, February 27.
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/27/saudi-oil-minister-to-trump-
we-are-taking-it-easy.html.
VAN DE GRAAF, THIJS. 2017. “Is OPEC Dead? Oil Exporters, the Paris Agree-
ment and the Transition to a Post-Carbon World.” Energy Research &
Social Science 23 (January): 182–88.
VAN DE GRAAF, THIJS, AND MICHAEL BRADSHAW. 2018. “StrandedWealth: Rethink-
ing the Politics of Oil in an Age of Abundance.” International Affairs 94
(6): 1309–28.
WALL STREET JOURNAL. 2016. “Barrel Breakdown.” Wall Street Journal, April 15.
http://graphics.wsj.com/oil-barrel-breakdown/.
WANG, HERMAN, BRIAN SCHEID, ROSEMARY GRIFFIN, AND EKLAVYA GUPTE. 2020.
“OPEC+ Gets No Oil Cut Help from the US, as G20 Energy
Talks Continue.” S&P Global Platts, April 10. https://www.spglobal.
com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/oil/041020-opec-gets-no-
oil-cut-help-from-the-us-as-g20-energy-talks-continue.
YERGIN, DANIEL. 2008. The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power. Free
Press trade pbk. ed. New York: Free Press.
_____. 2014. “The Global Impact of US Shale.” Project Syndicate, January
8. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/daniel-yergin-
traces-the-effects-of-america-s-shale-energy-revolution-on-the-balance-
of-global-economic-and-political-power?barrier = accessreg.
_____. 2015. “Opinion | Who Will Rule the Oil Market?” The New
York Times, January 23. sec. Opinion. https://www.nytimes.
com/2015/01/25/opinion/sunday/what-happened-to-the-price-
of-oil.html.
ZEIHAN, PETER. 2016. The Absent Superpower: The Shale Revolution and a World
without America. Austin, TX: Zeihan on Geopolitics.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/isq/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isq/sqaa042/5866005 by Singapore M
anagem
ent U
niversity user on 08 July 2020
